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JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA OF THE NONRESIDENT
DEFENDANT IN NEW YORK-A PROPOSED
SOLUTION
LOUIS R. FRUMERt AND PAUL S. GRAZIANott

WQIITHIN the framework of a memorandum from Attorney Brown to
Attorney Smith, an earlier article in this Review" portrayed the

dilemma of a nonresident defendant who desires to defend on the merits
a New York action based originally upon in rem jurisdiction without
thereby subjecting himself to the in personam jurisdiction of the court.
Such a defendant, it was pointed out, is interested in more than a mere
special appearance to contest jurisdiction over his person. He wishes to
enter a limited appearance, that is, an appearance for purposes of litigating the merits but limited to those claims which could be constitutionally adjudicated by the court in his absence by virtue of its in rem
jurisdiction. The right so to appear where the demand for in personam
relief is contained in the original complaint was shown to be highly
doubtful,2 and the New York decisions permit an in personam claim
to be added by a complaint amended as of course after the defendant

has appeared to litigate an in rem demand.3 Indeed, even the right to
relief on a special appearance is in doubt in many of the situations in
which the complaint demands both in rem and in personam, relief and

the defendant desires merely to prevent entry of a judgment in personam
without litigating the claim in rem.4
Attorney Brown and Attorney Smith continue their discussion of these
problems through the mails.
t Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.
Member of the New York Bar.
1. Frumer, Jurisdiction and Limited Appearance in New Yor.: Dilemma of the Nonresident Defendant, 18 FoaD. L. REv. 73 (1949). Reference to this article will hereafter
be made as: 18 Fopm. L. REv.
2. Id. at 75-87.
3. Mendoza v. Mendoza, 273 App. Div. 877, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 264 (Ist Dep't 1948))
appeal dismissed mem., 297 N. Y. 950, 80 N. E. 2d 347 (1948); Wajtman v. Brooklyn
Eastern District Terminal, 276 App. Div. 853, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 586 (2d Dep't 1949). There

is considered to be discretion in the court as to a motion for leave to add new caues
sounding in personam in an amended or supplemental complaint. 18 FoRD.L. Rzv. at 83-9S.
4. 18 FoRD. L. Ray. at 75-81.
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SMITH: I have read your memorandum and, in actdition, have done
some independent research on the special appearance situation in New
York, as exemplified by the recent case of Brainardv. Brainard. I have
a few observations in connection with that problem which I should like
you to consider. In the Brainard case, as you undoubtedly recall, al
action for divorce and alimony was commenced by service of process
outside the state pursuant to Section 235 of the Civil Practice Act. The
defendant served an answer, asserting therein merely his objection to
the court's exercise of jurisdiction over his person on the ground that he,
a nonresident, had not been personally served within the state. Plaintiff
took the position that service of the answer constituted a general appearance under Section 237 of the Civil Practice Act, thereby resulting
in a waiver of all objections to the sufficiency of process. Special Term
held that under the circumstances service of the answer did not constitute a general appearance. The Appellate Division reversed, two
justices dissenting, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.' The majority
in the Appellate Division took the view that defendant should have
raised his objection to the service of process by motion, appearing
specially for that purpose, but did not indicate precisely what motion
he should have made. Defendant contended throughout that there was
no motion available to him. He could not have moved to vacate service
of process since service was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to
determine the marital status.' Nor, he contended, could he have moved
for judgment under subdivision 1 of Rule 107 of the Rules of Civil
Practice' since the in personam demand for alimony, custody, and counsel fee did not constitute a separate 6ause of action for purposes of that
rule.
In your memorandum, as I read it, the only serious objection mentioned by you to Brainard's use of Rule 107 was, as he contended, the
5. 272 App. Div. 575, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (Ist Dep't 1947), aff'd mere., 297 N. Y. 916,
79 N. E. 2d 744 (1948).
6. The Court of Appeals answered the questions certified but wrote no opinion.
7. The leading case is probably Jackson v. Jackson, 290 N. Y. 512, 49 N. E. 2d 988
(1943). Plaintiff commenced an action for a separation and for invalidation of a separation agreement by serving her nonresident husband personally without the state pursuant
to an order. He appeared specially and moved to vacate the service of process. The Court
of Appeals held that since the demand for annulment of the separation agreement did not
affect the court's jurisdiction in rem over the separation cause the motion to vacate service
had been properly denied.
8. The relevant portion of Rule 107 provides: "After the service of the complaint, tile
defendant may serve notice of motion for judgment dismissing the complaint, or one or
more causes of action stated therein, on the complaint and an affidavit tending to show:
"1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant."
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restriction imposed therein by use of the words "causes of action."' I am
led to believe that another, perhaps equally serious, objection may exist
against moving under the first subdivision of that rule. Historically,
the objection "That the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant" did not apply and was never intended to apply to a situation
where the objection was based upon the insufficiency of process or its
service, but rather to a case where the defendant was challenging the
jurisdiction of the court over his person on the ground that he was a
person not subject to such jurisdiction.
An analysis of the cases interpreting the pertinent provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Practice Act and the Rules of Civil
Practice, may serve to explain my position. 10
Section 421 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided that serving a
copy of a demurrer constituted a general appearance.1 1 Yet Section 488,
predecessor to Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice, provided, in
relevant part, that
"The defendant may demur to the complaint, where one or more of the
following objections thereto appear upon the face thereof:
"1. That the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant."
And Section 498, predecessor to Rule 107 of the Rules of Civil Practice,
provided:
"Where any of the matters enumerated in section 488 of this act as grounds
of demurrer, do not appear on the face of the complaint, the objection may
2
be taken by answer."'
In other words, an objection to the court's jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant could be raised by demurrer under Section 488 if the
objection appeared upon the face of the complaint, or by answer under
Section 498 if the objection did not appear upon the face of the complaint. But under Section 421 service of a demurrer or of an answer
constituted a general appearance, an appearance generally held to effect
a waiver of an objection to jurisdiction of the person. 3
9. 18 Fopn. L. RFv. at 75-81.
10. For a statement of the steps in the development of the New York Code of Procedure, see Coe and Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field
Code, 27 CopNELL L. Q. 238 (1942).
11. Service of an answer or of a notice of appearance also constituted a general
appearance.
12. Similarly, it has been held that the objections contained in Rule 107 may be taken
by answer instead of by motion, at the option of the defendant. Gentilala v. Fay Taxicabs, Inc., 214 App. Div. 255, 257, 212 N. Y. Supp. 101, 104 (1st Dep't 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 243 N. Y. 397, 153 N. E. 848 (1926); Rothschild, New York Civil Practice
Simplified: II, 27 CoL. L. Rav. 413, 414 (1927).
13. See the leading case of Reed v. Chilson, 142 N. Y. 152, 36 N. E. 884 (1894), as
well as the more recent Brainard case.
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The apparent conflict between the foregoing provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure14 and the cases holding that a general appearance
waived an objection to the court's jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant can be resolved only by noting the construction early placed
by the New York courts on the words "jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant" as used expressly in Code Section 488 and by reference
in Section 498.
Probably the leading case construing those demurrer provisions is
Nones v. Hope Mutual Life Insurance Co.' The defendant, a Connecticut corporation doing business in New York, served a notice of appearance and of retainer of an attorney and then filed an answer, alleging
therein that the court had no jurisdiction of its person because process
had not been served upon it in the manner required by Section 135 of
the Code of Procedure, namely, by publication. The court held that
defendant, by its general appearance, had waived its objection to the
manner in which process had been served. In arriving at its decision
the court construed the words "jurisdiction of the person of the defendant" contained in Section 147 of the Code of Procedure (predecessor to
Section 498, Code of Civil Procedure, and, eventually, to Rule 107,
Rules of Civil Practice) as follows:
"It will be observed that the answer is founded upon that section of the
Code which provides that when the court has no jurisdiction of the person of
the defendant, the objection may be taken by answer, but the objection taken
here is not that the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant,
but that the defendant had been irregularly served. . . .The meaning of the
clause 'that the court has no jurisdiction of the person' is, that the person is

not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and not that the suit has not been
regularly commenced. If the suit has not been regularly commenced, the
defendant must relieve himself from such irregularity by motion."' 0

That distinction was often emphasized, 7 but several cases, of which
Hamburger v. Bake' is probably the outstanding example, failed to
14. As well as, formerly, of the provisions in the Code of Procedure (compare §§ 130
and 139 with §§ 144 and 147), and of the modern practice provisions (compare § 237
of the Civil Practice Act with §§ 277-283 of the Act and Rules 106 and 107 of the Rules
of Civil Practice).
15. 5 How. Pr. 96 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
16. Id. at 98.
17. See Ogdensburgh & L. C. R.R. v. Vermont & C. R.R., 63 N. Y. 176, 181 (1875);
Belden v. Wilkinson, 44 App. Div. 420, 421, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1083 (1st Dep't 1899);
Heney v. Chartered Co., 71 Misc. 237, 238, 128 N. Y. Supp. 436, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1911);
3 CnARoDy, NEw YORK PRACrIcE 2248 (2d ed. 1931); 3 WAiT, Nrw YORK PRACTIMc $88
(4th ed. 1937) ; WEBB, ELmsENTs or PRAcncE 101 (1926).
18. 35 Hun 455 (N. Y. Gen. Term 1st Dep't 1885).
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draw it. 9 In that case a summons was served upon the nonresident
defendant in Virginia. He answered, setting forth his objection to the
court's jurisdiction over his person on the ground that he was a nonresident who had no property in New York and who had not been served
within the state. He then set forth several defenses to the merits. The
lower court held that service of the answer constituted a general appearance and a waiver of the objection to regularity of service, but General
Term for the First Department reversed, saying:
"This answer he had the right to make, for if the facts were as they were
alleged, then the court had no jurisdiction over his person and acquired none
by the service of the summons over him.... And where that may be the fact,
and it does not appear from the complaint itself, it may be relied upon as a
defense by way of answer. (Code Civil Pro., § 488, sub. 1; § 498)20

That decision plagued the courts, which alternately followed, - ' disapproved,' distinguished,2 or ignored24 it. There is, in my opinion, no
support for the result reached in the Hamburger case. The court simply

lost sight of the fact that Sections 488 and 498 of the Code of Civil
Procedure were never intended to cover objections to jurisdiction of the
person which were based upon the insufficiency of process or its service.
Section 424 of the Code expressly provided that "A voluntary general
appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of the
summons upon him." Furthermore, it was early held that a defendant
could relieve himself of an irregularity in process by motion only.?
You may ask: When could Code Section 488 be properly applied? A
good example is MIaltin v. Royal Petticoat Co.20 The complaint, in a
county court action for breach of a contract of employment, alleged
that defendant was a domestic corporation but did not allege the other
19. Hankinson v. Page, 31 Fed. 184 (S. D. N. Y. ISS7); Gordon v. Moore, 59 Misc.
151, 110 N. Y. Supp. 374 (App. Term Ist Dep't 190); Sullivan v. Frazee, 4 Rob. 616
(N. Y. Super. Ct. 1865) (decided under § 147 of the Code of Procedure, practically identical
to § 498 of the Code of Civil Procedure); see De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos Do
Estado, 200 App. Div. 82, 89, 162 N. Y. Supp. 815, 821 (Ist Dep't 1922).
20. Hamburger v. Baker, 35 Hun 455, 456 (N. Y. Gen. Term Ist Dep't 1855).
21. Hankinson v. Page, 31 Fed. 184 (S. D. N. Y. 1887).
22. See the lower court opinion in Reed v. Chilson, affirmed and set forth in full in
16 N. Y. Supp. 745 (Gen. Term Sth Dep't 1891), aff'd, 142 N. Y. 152, 36 N. E. 884 (1894).
23. Goldstein v. Goldsmith, 28 Misc. 569, 59 N. Y. Supp. 677 (App. Term 1st Dep't
1899); Sweetzer v. Kembert, 11 Misc. 107, 31 N. Y. Supp. 995 (City Ct. 189S).
24. E.g., McClure Newspaper Syndicate v. Times Printing Co. of Seattle, 164 App. Div.
105, 149 N. Y. Supp. 443 (1st Dep't 1914). The Brainard case is a more recent example.
25. Nones v. Hope Mutual Life Insurance Co., 5 How. Pr. 96 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
26. 147 N. Y. Supp. 545 (County Ct. 1914). For a more recent case see Auto Dealers
Discount Corp. v. Santoro, 170 Misc. 635, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 10 (County CL 1939).
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required jurisdictional facts. Defendant demurred on the ground that
it did not appear from the face of the complaint that the court had
jurisdiction of the defendant and of the subject of the action. Plaintiff
moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that service of the
demurrer constituted a general appearance under Section 421 of the Code

of Civil
Procedure, and that, under Meyers v. American Locomotive
Co., 28 such an appearance resulted in a waiver of the essential jurisdictional allegations. The court denied plaintiff's motion and sustained
the demurrer, saying:
"But in the case of Meyers v. Am. Locomotive Co. the objection of the jurisdictional facts [residence of the defendant] was waived by appearing and
answering upon the merits, without raising it....
".... To hold that when by demurrer you attack the jurisdiction of the court
you at the same time waive your rights under the same is inconsistent with all
'29
the canons of logic."

With respect to Code Section 498 (and its modern counterpart, Rule
107), they are properly invoked, say the authorities,

°

where, for exam-

ple, the defendant is a foreign executor or administrator, 31 and there
are no estate assets within the jurisdiction, 32 or is a foreign corporation
not doing business within the state.'
To sum up, then, it appears that under the Codes a defendant who
was seeking to raise the objection that the court was without jurisdiction
over his person could in the first instance3 4 do so in one of three ways,
27. N. Y. CONsT. Art VI, § 11; N. Y. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 340, 341; N. Y. CIv. PRAc.
ACT § 67 (3).
28. 201 N. Y. 163, 94 N. E. 605 (1911).
29. Maltin v. Royal Petticoat Co., 147 N. Y. Supp. 545, 546 (County Ct. 1914).
30. E.g., 3 CARMODY, NEW YORK PRACTICE 2248 (2d ed. 1931); WEBB, ELEMENTS OF
PRACTICE 101 (1926).
31. Helme v. Buckelew, 229 N. Y. 363, 128 N. E. 216 (1920); cf. Belden v. Wilkinson,
44 App. Div. 420, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1083 (1st Dep't 1899). "Jurisdiction over the person
in such cases as suits against foreign administrators, executors, and trustees, approaches
jurisdiction of the subject matter but falls considerably short." 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTicL
663 n. 6 (1938). See also the very recent case of Leighton v. Roper, 300 N. Y. 434,
91 N. E. 2d 876 (1950). While it is true that the general rule as to a foreign executor
or administrator is that he may neither sue nor be sued within our courts (Helme v.
Buckelew, supra, at 365-366), it has been held that the rule is not applicable to a foreign
testamentary trustee who is a resident of New York. Squier v. Houghton, 131 Misc. 129,
226 N. Y. Supp. 162 (Sup. Ct. 1927); see Braman v. Braman, 236 App. Div. 164, 168,
258 N. Y. Supp. 181, 186 (1st Dep't 1932).
32. See Leighton v. Roper, supra note 31.
33. Ogdensburgh & L. C. R.R. v. Vermont & C. R.R., 16 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 249, 254-55
(Sup. Ct. 1874), aff'd, 4 Hun 712 (N. Y. Gen. Term 3d Dep't 1875), notion to dismi s
appeal denied, 63 N. Y. 176 (1875).
34. Where a motion objecting to the court's jurisdiction has been denied, he may
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depending upon the basis of his objection. If his attack was to the
sufficiency of process or its service, his sole weapon was a motion. '"here,
however, the ground of his objection was that he was a person not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the objection could be raised
by demurrer if it appeared upon the face of the complaint, or by answer
if it did not appear upon the face of the complaint.
Results under the Civil Practice Act and Rules of Civil Practice have
been decidedly more uniform than those reached under the Codes, but
not without some judicial legislation. Section 237 of the Civil Practice
Act provides that serving upon plaintiff's attorney a copy of "a notice
of motion raising an objection to the complaint in point of law" (substitute for the demurrer 35 ) is one of the methods by which the defendant
may appear. A motion under Rule 106 or Rule 107 raises just such an
objection' It should follow, therefore, that a motion under either of
those rules constitutes a general appearance-and it does-with one
case-made exception: a motion under subdivision 1 of either rule, provided the defendant makes the motion on a special appearance 7
The reason why the courts have had to impose the special appearance
restriction upon motions made under the first subdivision of Rules 106
and 107 is easily explained. Section 237, as just noted, provides, first,
that serving a copy of a notice of motion raising an objection to the
complaint in point of law (that is, motions under Rules 106 and 107)
constitutes a general appearance, and then provides that "A voluntary
general appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of
the summons upon him." Once the courts failed to draw the distinction
between objections to the court's jurisdiction of the person based upon
reiterate the objection as a defense in his answer and proceed on the merits without thereby
being deemed to have waived his objection. Urquhart v. Urquhart, 196 Misc. 664, 667,
92 N. Y. S. 2d 484, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; de Marigny v. de Marigny, 193 Mlisc. 250, 252,
81 N. Y. S. 2d 229, 231 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd ,nem., 275 App. Div. 757, 83 N. Y. S. 2d
889 (1st Dep't 1949); cf. Zatarga v. Zatarga, 196 Misc. 448, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (Sup. CL
1949); see Muslusky v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 225 N. Y. 584, 588, 122 N. E. 461, 462
(1919). Or the defendant may appeal from the order denying his motion. Jackhon v.
National Grange Mutual Liability Co., 299 N. Y. 333, 87 N. E. 2d 283 (1949).
35. N. Y. Cv.P.Ac. AcT § 277; Shipley v. Schmitzer, 224 App. Div. 730, 229 N. Y.
Supp. 915 (1st Dep't 1928); MEDnWA, PLEADIEC &-PRACTICE u .Dm THE NE w Yon CvIL
PRACTICE AcT 77 (1922) ; see CLRx, CODE Pr.EAD= 538 and n. 135 (2d ed. 1947).
36. E.g., Montgomery v. East Ridgelawn Cemetery, 182 Misc. 562, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 295
(Sup. CL 1943), aff'd without opinion, 268 App. Div. 857, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 843 (1st Dep't
1944).
37. Ibid.; 3 CARmODY, NEW YoRE PRACTICE'2251 (2d ed. 1931). Permitting objections
to process to be raised under Rule 107 has caused some difficulty on the question of waiver
by failure to move within the time specified therein. Maloney v. Ferguson, 182 MIisr. 564,
566, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 937, 938 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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the insufficiency of process or its service and those based upon the
ground that the defendant was a person not subject to the jurisdiction
of the court-and permitted objections to process to be raised by motion under subdivision 1 of Rule 107-they were faced with the problem
of preventing the application of Section 237. The problem was solved
by requiring an objection under that subdivision to be raised by motion,
with the defendant appearing specially. 8 Once that requirement was
imposed upon objections to process, it was a short step towards holding
that a special appearance was required in all cases where subdivision 1
was sought to be invoked.3
I do not mean to convey the impression that the distinction raised
and recognized under the Codes may not be raised and recognized in
the future. On the contrary, the plaintiff in the Brainard case raised
that very point in her brief to the Court of Appeals.40 Personally, I see
no good reason for distinguishing between the grounds upon which
jurisdiction of the person may be challenged.
BROWN: There is ample authority to support your position. I did
not go into this aspect of the special appearance problem in my memorandum primarily because I was more concerned with the limited than
with the special appearance. This distinction as to the manner in which
objection is to be made to theI court's jurisdiction over the person cannot
38. Since noting an appearance to be special for the sole purpose of contesting jurisdiction over the person is sufficient to prevent the application of § 237 of the Civil Practice
Act where a motion for judgment is concerned, why can it not be said that a similar result
will follow from the service of an answer which notes the appearance to be special and
does no more than challenge the court's jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.
39. Montgomery v. East Ridgelawn Cemetery, 182 Misc. 562, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 295
(Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd without opinion, 268 App. Div. 857, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 843 (1st Dep't
1944) (defendant foreign corporation held to have waived its objection to lack of jurisdiction on the ground that it was not doing business within the state by seeking dismissal
at the same time on ground that plaintiff lacked capacity to sue); cf. Rothschild v. Mendel,
64 N. Y. S. 2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (defendant foreign corporation, contending that It
was not doing business within the state, held to have made a special appearance and thus
preserved its jurisdictional objection); 3 CARmoDY, NEw YORK PRccrca 2251 (2d ed.
1931). Contra: Auto Dealers Discount Corp. v. Santoro, 170 Misc. 635, 11 N. Y. S. 2d
10 (County Ct. 1939) (defendant allowed to raise question of jurisdiction by denial in
his answer of allegation that he was a resident of Nassau County and by affirmative
defense of lack of jurisdiction); cf. Davidoff v. Roger Wurmser, Inc., 27 N. Y. S. 2d 555
(County Ct. 1941), af'd mem., 261 App. Div. 1087, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 558 (2d Dep't 1941)
(service of answer without raising therein plaintiff's failure to allege residence of defendant
within the county held to constitute a waiver of the objection).
40. Brief for Appellee, p. 10, Brainard v. Brainard, 297 N. Y. 916 (1948). Cf. Carnegie
v. Carnegie, 274 App. Div. 887, 83 N. Y. S. 2d 252 (1st Dep't 1948), where the defendant
was permitted to do by "notice of special appearance" all that Brainard unsuccessfully
tried to do by "answer."
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be summarily dismissed despite the fact that, as you note, it has for
the most part been ignored by the cases decided under Rule 107.
I agree that there is no basis, other than historical, for attempting to
distinguish between types of jurisdiction over the person. Lawyers
simply do not think in terms of such a distinction. Courts and text
writers alike have used the term "jurisdiction over the person" to include
defects in process and service of process." From a constitutional aspect
defects in process and its service relate to the problem of acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If a non-domiciliary
of New York is served outside of the state the court does not thereby
acquire jurisdiction over his person. Similarly, the court does not obtain
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not doing business in the state
even if an officer of the corporation should be served within the state.
In each instance the inquiry is whether the court may enter an in personam judgment against the defendant, and the procedure should
be uniform whereby a defendant may object to a court's exercise of in
personam jurisdiction, regardless of the basis for that objection. Such
a uniform procedure is achieved under Rule 12 (b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which provides in part that
".. . the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party...
It is probable however that Rule 12(b) was so phrased as to eliminate
any possibility that the term "jurisdiction over the person" would be
held not to include defects in process and its service.
The problem of the special appearance in New York has been studied
by the New York Judicial Council and it has recommended enactment
of a bill which would abolish any possible distinction as to types of
41.

See note 39 supra. CARaOne"S

,ALsAL or Naw Yonn CzVin PRAcEc

(Carr, Fin

& Saxe 3d ed. 1946), referring to a motion under Rule 106 for defect appearing on the
face of the complaint, notes: "A void service of the summons would not illustrate a case
under this subdivision. In such a case, although the court gets no jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, that fact would not appear on the face of the complaintV' Id.
at 259. And, referring to a motion under Rule 107 on the ground that the court has not
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, "Such objection is usually waived by answering, so that defendant's only remedy is by a proper motion, appearing specially." Id.
at 271.
42. .. g., Orange Theater Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F. 2d 871 (3d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 740 (1944); SrTuamano, Corcr or Liws 69 et seq. (1937);
REsTATEmENT, CoNmtcT Or LAWS §§ 47, 74 et seq. (1934).
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jurisdiction over the person. Under the Council bill, a new Section 237-a
would be added to the Civil Practice Act:
"§ 237-a. Defendant's special appearance. 1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision two, a defendant may make a special appearance solely
to object to the court's jurisdiction over his person. Such objection, whether
based on the ground that process or its service is insufficient or that the
defendant is a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, must be
raised by a motion to set aside the service of process or to strike out part of
the complaint, as may be appropriate. The objection, if raised in a manner
other than that provided in this section or if combined with an objection to
the merits, except as otherwise provided in subdivision four, shall be deemed
waived.
"2. An objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be waived by joining therewith a motion objecting to the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
"3. Where the court has no jurisdiction over any cause of action stated in
the complaint, the court shall order the service of process set aside. Where,
however, process and its service are sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over
one or more of the causes of action stated in the complaint, the court shall
order struck out of the. complaint such part of it, including all or part of a
prayer for relief, as is beyond the court's jurisdiction, in which case the
complaint will be deemed amended accordingly, or the court may order an
amended complaint to be served.
"4. After a motion made pursuant to this section has been denied, the
objection to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be
set forth as a defense in the answer and the defendant may litigate the action
on the merits without being deemed to have waived his objection to the court's
jurisdiction over his person.
"5. A notice of the motion made pursuant to this section, if served within
twenty days after service of the complaint and made returnable within ten
days thereafter, or, if there be no sitting of court within ten days, then for
the first term or sitting of court thereafter at which the motion can be heard,
shall operate to stay all further proceedings in the action until the expiration
of ten days after service of a copy of the order deciding the motion and a
written notice of the entry thereof; provided, however, that the court may in
its discretion vacate or modify the stay on motion made upon notice to the
'4
opposing party. 3
43.

SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL

185, 189 (1950).

As ancillary to the recommended new § 237-a, it was proposed that, for correlation purposes, subdivision 1 of Rules 106 and 107 be deleted, and § 257 of the Civil Practice Act
be amended to permit a defendant to demand a copy of the complaint without having
made "either a general or a special appearance," thus overcoming the holding of Muslusky
v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 225 N. Y. 584, 122 N. E. 461 (1919). See Lisle v. Palmer,
29 N. Y. S. 2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd without opinion, 263 App. Div. 720, 30 N. Y.
2d 1021 (2d Dep't 1941), and the Council's report at 191, 195, 213-17.
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The Judicial Council bill does not go so far as Federal Rule 12(b),

which eliminates the idea of waiver by joinder of defenses to the merits:

"No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more

other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion." The

defendant may raise the defenses listed in Rule 12 (b) either by motion
or by answer

44

The need for a special appearance to object to juris-

diction over the person is thus eliminated

but such an objection may

be waived by first proceeding on the merits. "If the defense of lack of

jurisdiction of the person is not raised by motion before answer or in
the answer itself it is by the express provisions of paragraph (h) of
Civil Procedure Rule 12 to be treated as waived, not because of defendant's voluntary appearance, but because of his failure to assert the

defense within the time prescribed by statute."4 10 The defenses specified

in Rule 12(b), whether raised by motion or answer, ordinarily are to
be heard and determined in advance of trial on application of any
party.17 The court may however, under subdivision (d) of Rule 12,
order that the hearing and determination be deferred until the trial.
If the objection, whether raised by motion or answer, be overruled, the
defendant may litigate the merits without waiver of his right to appeal
after final judgment on the jurisdictional ground.43 The jurisdictional
defense need not be reiterated in the answer if it has been raised by
44. Under Federal Rule 12(g), "... . If a party makes a motion under this rule and
does not include therein all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule
permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of
the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule."
Under subdivision (h), "A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not
present either by motion . . . or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or reply,
except . . . .'the defenses of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
failure to join an indispensable party, failure to state a legal defense to a claim, and the
objection of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
45. Orange Theater Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F. 2d 871 (3d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 322 U. S. 740 (1944); 2 Mooa's F DFRAL PRAcTicE 2260 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
46. Orange Theater Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., supra note 45, at 874.
47. The application is made under subdivision (d) of Federal Rule 12.
48. Molesphini v. Bruno, 26 F. Supp. 595 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). Professor Moore notes
that "An objection as to lack of jurisdiction of the person, improper venue, insufficient
process, or insufficient service of process having been raised by motion and disposed of
adversely to the moving party, the ruling becomes the law of the case and hence normally
the issue should not be reopened again by motion or at the trial, but should be reserved
for the appellate court on appeal from a final judgment." 2 Mooan's FrEznALx PRA~CrTe
2266 (2d ed. 1948). But he also points out: "Law of the case does not, however, have
the inexorable effect of res judicata and does not preclude the court from reconsidering
an earlier ruling if the court feels that the ruling was probably erroneous and more harm
would be done by adhering to the earlier rule than from the delay incident to a reconsideration and the possible change in the rule of law to be applied." Id. at 2266 n. 11.
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motion in order to preserve the point for appeal.49 There is authority,
however, that a motion to strike will not be granted if the objection is
set up in the answer after denial of a motion, even though such reiteration serves no purpose."'
The Judicial Council bill does contain the provision, in subdivision 2,
that an objection to jurisdiction over the person is not waived by joinder
of a motion objecting to the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter.
To that extent the present rule in New York that under a special appearance a defendant can do nothing but challenge jurisdiction over his
person would be modified. 1 Certainly, "No sound reason appears why
a litigant should not be able to obtain a ruling of a trial court upon
both jurisdictional questions.""2 Strong argument can be made for the
proposition that disposal should be made of jurisdictional objections
before defendant is permitted to take any action on the merits. The
difficulty I find with this position however is that it leads to piecemeal
disposition of the case, and, in a state such as New York, the further
delay caused by separate appeals.
The fact remains however that the Judicial Council bill is a good bill
as far as it goes and it would appear to be highly desirable that it be
enacted into law.
SMITH: The Judicial Council bill does seem to be a step in the right
direction. True, recommended new Section 237-a does not go so far
as Federal Rule 12, but to adopt that rule in New York would necessitate
a considerable modification of its present motion practice. It might,
however, be desirable to adopt so much of the federal rule as eliminates
the idea of waiver simply because objections to jurisdiction are joined
with objections to the merits. A provision could then be included similar to subdivision (d) of Federal Rule 12 to the effect that the jurisdictional defenses "shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial." In support of the Council
recommendation as it now stands it might be noted that it apparently
seeks to clarify and improve without effecting any radical change in
the fundamental special appearance concepts generally familiar to the
New York bar.
49. Molesphini v. Bruno, supra note 48.
50. International Pulp Equipment Co., Ltd. v. St. Regis Kraft Co., 59 F. Supp. 289
(D. Del. 1945).
51. Jackson v. National Grange Mutual Liability Co., 299 N. Y. 333, 87 N. E. 2d 283
(1949); SixazENTH AxNuAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORC JUDIcIAL CoUNciL 18S, 213-215
(1950).

52.

Note, Practice: Objection to Jurisdiction Over the Person and the Subject Matter,

30 CAraF. L. REv. 690, 692 (1942).
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Incidentally, the Council bill does not seem to affect the limited appearance situation. Did the Council make any attempt to deal with the
limited appearance?

BROWN: No, the Council merely took cognizance of the problem. As
to addition of an in personam claim after defendant has appeared to

litigate a claim in rem, the study notes that:
"Where the original complaint against such a defendant [a nonresident
defendant who has been served with process outside the state) states only an
in rem claim, a general appearance to contest that claim on the merits will
probably subject the defendant to an in personam claim should such a claim be
alleged in a complaint amended as of course. ' 33

A recent case in this connection is Waiman v. Brooklyn Eastern
District Termina.

4

In an action for personal injuries against the

Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, defendant attempted to implead
the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railway Company as a third-party defendant
under Section 193-a of the New York Civil Practice Act.5 Service of
the summons was vacated on the grounds (1) that the Wheeling Company was not doing business in New York and (2) that the attempted
service was not made upon a proper person.G The third-party plaintiff

then attached property of the Wheeling Company in New York, serving
the summons and complaint in Ohio.

The Wheeling Company appeared

after the attachment in the third-party "action brought against it by
the Brooklyn Eastern District Jrerminal," serving an answer to the thirdparty complaint. The original plaintiff then moved for leave to serve
an amended complaint for the purpose of making the Wheeling Company a defendant in the main action s The motion was denied by Mr.
Justice Fennelly:
SXTEENTH ANuAL REPORT or Tm NEw Yoa J DIcAL Cou'.cPr. 185, 191 (1950).
54. 276 App. Div. 853, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 586 (2d Dep't 1949).
55. The relevant portion of § 193-a provides: "1. After the service of his answer, a
defendant may bring in a person not a party in the action, who is or may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him, by serving as a third-party plaintiff
upon such person a summons and copy of a verified complaint."
56. 119 N. Y. L. J. 55, col 5 (Sup. CL Jan. 6, 1948). A direct action by plaintiff
against the Wheeling Company had previously been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the person. Wajtman v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 270 App. Div. 823, 60 N. Y. S. 2d
293 (2d Dep't 1946).
57. The Wheeling Company does not appear to have made any attempt to vacate the
attachment. There perhaps might be some question whether an attachment may be had
in a "liability over" situation. Cf. Zenith Bathing Pavilion, Inc. v. Fair Oaks Steamship
53.

Corp., 240 N. Y. 307, 148 N. E. 532 (1925).

58. Under subdivision 3 of § 193-a of the New York Civil Practice Act, "The plaintiff
may amend his pleading to assert against the third-party defendant any claim which
the plaintiff might have asserted against the third-party defendant, had he been joined
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"Since plaintiff could not have joined this third party defendant originally
in the action because of jurisdictional limitations, he should not now be permitted to accomplish indirectly that which he could not do directly."' 9

Despite the contention of the third-party defendant that it had entered
an appearance limited to the third-party complaint,"0 the Appellate Division for the Second Department per curiam granted the original plaintiff
leave to serve the amended complaint. ". . respondent, by appearing

and filing its answer to the third-party complaint, appeared in this
action" and "subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the court. ....

01

This holding, just as that in Mendoza v. Mendoza, 2 raises serious constitutional questions.63
It must be conceded that the results reached in the Mendoza and Waftman cases might be the same under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 A similar problem arises in interpleader proceedings if the court
originally as a defendant." Although leave of court would appear to be required for
such an amendment except where it may be made as of course (see N. Y. CxV. PRAC.
AcT § 244), from a pleading standpoint there would not appear to be any discretion In
the court as to whether the amendment will be allowed, at least, that is, where the claim
is the same as that asserted against the original defendant. TwL-TY
ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE NEw YORK JUDIcaAL CouNciL 212 (1946). See 18 FoRD. L. REv. at 90.
59. Wajtman v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 121 N. Y. L. J. 2225, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. June 22, 1949).
60. "The respondent herein, having had its property tied up with an attachment, wa6
obliged to appear and did appear, according to its notice of appearance, only in the third
party 'action brought against it by the Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal,' and served
an answer to that third party complaint." Brief for Appellee, p. 3, Wajtman v. Brooklyn
Eastern District Terminal, 276 App. Div. 853 (2d Dep't 1949).
61. 276 App. Div. 853, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 586, 587 (2d Dep't 1949).
62. 77 N. Y. S. 2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd without opinion, 273 App Div. 877,
77 N. Y. S. 2d 264 (1st Dep't 1948), appeal dismissed mem, 297 N. Y. 950, 80 N. E. 2d
347 (1948). An action for annulment was commenced against a nonresident, process being
served by publication. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, thereby making a
general appearance under § 237 of the New York Civil Practice Act. Plaintiff then served
upon defendant's attorney a complaint amended as of course, containing a new and independent claim for $20,000 alleged to have been fraudulently obtained from her by defendant
and his father. The court denied defendant's motion to strike this new cause of action
on the ground that it possessed no discretion as to an amendment made as of course, and
that such amendments may add new and additional causes of action.
63. See 18 FoRw. L. REV. at 89-93. The Wajtman case appears to go even further than
Mendoza in so far as it allows an additional party to assert a claim directly against a
nonresident defendant. It is more limited however in so far as the nature of the claim
is concerned. Cf. Ex Parte Indiana Transportation Co., 244 U. S. 456 (1917).
64. Federal Rule 5(a) requires every pleading subsequent to the original complaint to
be served upon each of the parties affected but under Rule 5(b), "Whenever under these
rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney
the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered
by the court." Professor Moore suggests that "It is quite likely that the summons issued
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is acting on the basis of in rem jurisdiction, or if there has been nationwide service under the Federal Interpleader Act. A recent case in that
field supports to a certain extent the Wajtman holding. In a proceeding
apparently under the Federal Interpleader Act, the stakeholder sought to
have determined conflicting claims to a deposit made on the purchase
price of certain property. After appearance by the nonresident defendant claimants, the court permitted the filing of a cross-claim for specific

performance of the same contract, basing its holding upon Federal Rule
13(g) relating to cross-claims.es
upon the filing of the original complaint and served at the institution of the action is
sufficient process to embrace all other claims for relief which may be asserted in subsequent
pleadings," citing Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59 (1938). 2 Mooan's FrnzAL PeACICE
1309 n. 2 (2d ed. 1948). But Adam v. Saenger involved service of a counterclaim on the
attorney of a nonresident plaintiff, a party who had invoked the jurisdiction of the court.
That situation is the same as where defendant affirmatively invokes the jurisdiction of the
court by filing a counterclaim. Merchants Heat & Light Co. v. J. B. Cloiv & Sons,
204 U. S. 286 (1907); Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F. 2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947). Freeman
v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U. S. 448 (1943), must be placed in the latter category. Plaintiff,
a Massachusetts corporation, instituted an action for breach of contract against an Ohio
resident in a Massachusetts state court. Defendant was personally served while temporarily in Massachusetts. The action was removed to the federal court where defendant
appeared generally, filed a counterclaim, and moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff
then moved for leave to amend its complaint to add a claim for treble damages under
the Clayton Act, a claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Attack
upon the amendment centered upon the question, one of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, whether in a removed action a claim may be added by amendment which would
not have been within the jurisdiction of the state court, and the related problem of venue
as to the new claim. Defendant's petition for certiorari stated: "The only question presented is whether a plaintiff may amend his complaint in a removed action so as to state
a new and independent cause of action against the defendant which would be outside
the state court's jurisdiction." Id. at 453 n. 8. Discussing that question, the problem of
service of process was argued in the briefs but the majority opinion disposed of that
aspect by merely stating "Process is of course a different matter. But under the Rules
of Civil Procedure service of an amended complaint may be made upon the attorney,
the procedure which apparently was followed here," citing Adam v. Saenger, supra, and
Federal Rule 5. Id. at 455. The dissent did not even mention the problem of service.
65. "Claimants . . . assert, however, that being residents of the State of Illinois, they
have entered a limited appearance in this interpleader action in which they have been
made parties and are not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for any other purpose.
An answer thereto is, that a Court in interpleader actions acquires general jurisdiction of
the subject-matter and of the parties." Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F. R. D. 621, 624
(W. D. Mo. 1949); cf. Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F. 2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950);
Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F. 2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950); Stitzel-Weller Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (W. D. Ky. 1941). In the Hagan case, supra, the
court by way of dictum stated that Bank of Neosho v. Colcord "gave broader scope to
Rule 13(g) than we think proper." 180 F. 2d at 504.n. 6. For a splendid discussion of
the jurisdictional problems involved in adding new claims in interpleader, see Professor
Chafee's articles: Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Interpleader, 56 Hmv. L. RLv.
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Obviously, if the third-party defendant in the Wajtman case had been
permitted to make a limited appearance after attachment of its property,
either as to the property attached in the first instance or to the thirdparty claim, the plaintiff could not have amended his complaint to assert
a claim directly against it.6"
As to the limited appearance where the complaint requests in rein
and in personam relief (as is true in substance where jurisdiction is
based solely upon an attachment), the Judicial Council noted:
"If that motion [referring to a motion on special appearance under the
proposed Section 237-a] is granted the defendant could probably not thereafter safely litigate on the merits the remaining cause or causes of action. To
permit him to do so would be to place him in a better position than that
occupied by a defendant against whom only an in rem claim is made in the
original complaint but who is later subjected to an in personam claim in the
amended complaint." 67
It is true that it would not be logical to grant the right of limited
appearance merely where the complaint originally requests both in rem
and in personam relief, for to do so would be to place such a defendant
in a better position than a defendant against whom only an in rem
claim is asserted in the original complaint. While the situation of an
in personam claim added in an amended complaint is perhaps more
troublesome than an in personam claim contained in an original complaint," the right of limited appearance should be available in both
instances.
The Judicial Council study continues:
"Another, perhaps more cogent, reason exists for denying a defendant the
right to defend on the merits after his motion made on a special appearance
has been sustained. Traditionally, a special appearance has been permitted for
the sole purpose of objecting, by motion, to the court's exercise of jurisdiction
over defendant's person. Only after the motion has been denied has the defendant been, as he still is, permitted to defend the action on the merits without
waiving the jurisdictional objection previously raised by him.
541 (1943); Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 HARv. L.
Rav. 929 (1943).
66. 18 FORD. L. Rv. at 81-85, 89-90, 93-95. Cf. Nicholas & Co. v. Societe Anonyme,
189 Misc. 863, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem., 272 App. Div. 1002, 74
N. Y. S. 2d 403 (1st Dep't 1947); Alkalaj v. Alkalaj, 190 Misc. 326, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 678
(Sup. Ct. 1947).
67. SixTEENTH ANNuAL REPORT OF THE NEw YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL 185, 192 (1950).
The Judicial Council footnote to the statement of this latter situation (p. 191 n. 1) cites
the Mendoza case and then makes reference to Frumer, supra note 1, at 88 et seq. for an
analysis of the problems involved in the Mendoza and related cases.
68. 18 FoRD. L. REv. at 95.
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"Permitting a defendant to litigate the cause or causes of action remaining
after his motion made on a special appearance has been granted would be
permitting him to make not only a special but also a limited appearance in the
action. The limited appearance, however, has apparently not been sanctioned
by the New York courts.P Whether or not a defendant should be permitted
to make such an appearance involves, in some instances at any rate (for example, matrimonial actions), such serious considerations of public policy that
this aspect of the problem is not dealt with at this time."70
Of course serious policy considerations are involved in allowing a defendant to make a limited appearance in proceedings such as matrimonial actions; and, concededly, the limited appearance does go beyond
the scope of the traditional special appearance. The limited appearance
cannot be blindly accepted for all situations, but a study of the problem
certainly is to be desired.
I might also note that the Judicial Council study appears to question
my interpretation of Zeide v. Flexser7 ' and Paprin v. Bitker, 2 cases
which I considered as permitting a limited appearance in New York.3
SMITH: Your reference to Zeide v. Flexser and Paprin v. Bitker has
prompted me to re-read those cases. It seems to me that they are not
authority for permitting a limited appearance. The Zeide case was an
action for the reasonable value of services and disbursements, money
loaned, and to set aside the fraudulent conveyance of property situated
in New York. The court denied defendant's motion to vacate service
by publication because such service was sufficient to confer in rem jurisdiction upon the court, that is, the fraudulent conveyance might be set
aside without entry of a personal judgment against the defendant. The
Paprin case was an action for specific performance with an alternate
prayer for money damages. Defendant served a notice of special appearance solely to contest jurisdiction of his person, but made no motion. 4
Plaintiff moved to strike defendant's special appearance. The court pro69. Citing Swift v. Tross, 55 How. Pr. 255 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1878) (defendant not
permitted to make a limited appearance in the attachment situation). For criticm, see
18 FoRD.L. REv. at 84.
70. SnarE
- ANxuAL REPORT or TnE NEW Yoan JuDiIAL Couczr 185, 192 (1950).
71. 175 Misc. 911, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 610 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
72. 64 N. Y. S. 2d 289 (Sup. C. 1946).
73. 18 Fo D. L. REv. at 79-80.
74. Serving a notice of special appearance, without more, has been held to be insufficient to prevent the entry of a judgment by default. See, e.g., Piccrilli v. Piccirilli,
118 N. Y. L. J. 1497, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 1947). A stipulation should be obtained
ant's motion papers. Subdivision 5 of the Judicial Council's recommended new § 237-a
would do away with the need for requesting such a stay provided the limitations therein
contained are complied with by the defendant.
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ceeded on the theory that defendant had moved to vacate service of
the summons and then granted plaintiff's motion on the ground that
service without the state had been sufficient to confer jurisdiction as to
the in rem cause, that is, for specific performance.
In both cases, it is true, the court granted to the defendant "leave
.. . to serve an answer, reserving, however, his right to object to the
jurisdiction of this court in respect to any judgment in personam."I 8
But my understanding is that under New York law after a motion raising
an objection to jurisdiction over the person has been denied, the defendant may proceed on the merits without waiving his jurisdictional
objection." If that is so, the mere fact that the court in each case expressly permitted the defendant to litigate the merits while reserving his
right to object to the court's jurisdiction 7 to grant in personam relief
would seem to have no special significance. 7
The true case of permitting the defendant to make a limited appearance would seem to be one where the defendant's motion objecting to
personal jurisdiction is granted and the defendant is, nevertheless, permitfed to come in and litigate the in rem portion of the action on the
merits. Such was not the fact in either the Zeide or Paprin case. In
both, defendants moved (or, as in Paprin, the defendant was treated as
having moved) to vacate the service of the summons and their motions
were denied on the ground that service had been sufficient to confer in
rem jurisdiction. There seems to be ample support for the position that
the courts could not under the circumstances have done other than to
deny the motions to vacate."
The Wajtman case is most interesting. It might be noted, however,
that the in personam claim set up by the plaintiff against the third-party
defendant, the Wheeling Company, was a claim arising out of the same
transaction. While I agree that it is most unfair to permit a plaintiff
to assert against a nonresident defendant an in personam claim which
is entirely unrelated to the claim asserted in the original complaint, I see
no injustice in compelling such a defendant to submit to jurisdiction
for all purposes with respect to all transactions which form the basis of
plaintiff's original claim. In a foreclosure-deficiency judgment situation,
for example, if a defendant wants to contest the plaintiff's in rem claim
on the merits he should, in the event of defeat, be prepared to accept
75
Misc.
76.
77.
78.
94 N.

Paprin v. Bitker, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 289, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Zeide v. Flexser, 175
911, 913, 25 N. Y. S. 2d 610, 612 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
See note 34 supra.
Ibid.
Jackson v. Jackson, 290 N. Y. 512, 49 N. E. 2d 988 (1943); Berson v. Scott,
Y. S. 2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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a judgment against him for the deficiency. The plaintiff should not,
however, be permitted to add or substitute, after the nonresident's
appearance, an entirely new and unrelated claim as, for example,
one for assault and battery. Such a defendant's appearance should be
limited to contesting all claims of the plaintiff, in personam as well as
in rem, but only in respect to the transaction or transactions complained
of in the original complaint.
BROWN: Your view of the Zeide and Paprincases is not without merit,
the rule being well established that when a motion made on special appearance has been denied, defendant may proceed on the merits without
waiving his original objection. However, as I read those cases, they
involved more than merely an application of that rule. Concededly, as
you state, neither is a true case of a limited appearance, since in each
case the motion made on special appearance was denied. But it did
appear to me that the result was in substance to allow a limited appearance, especially in view of the authority which allows relitigation of
the jurisdictional objection after it has been denied and set up in the
answer." Even though the jurisdictional objection has been denied because service was deemed sufficient to confer in rem jurisdiction, if it
can be relitigated at the trial, the net result can be a trial on the merits
as to the in rem cause with the court ultimately refusing to grant a
judgment in personam. That is not a true limited appearance, but I
think the result can be the same. Of course, the difficulty in interpretation of the Zeide and Pap-rin cases arises not only from the brevity of
the opinions but also from the confusion which exists as to the right of
special appearance in the situations involvedVSO I think that it probably
can be said that in neither of those actions did the court have in mind
the concept of the limited appearance.
Moreover, I would like to call your attention again to Engel v. Engel,""
where the court granted in part defendant's motion to set aside the
service of summons (the procedure proposed under Section 237-a as
recommended by the Judicial Council). The case was settled, and the
opinion does not deal at all with the right to litigate thereafter the in
rem claim on the merits. I am however advised by the attorney for
the defendant in that action that the parties were proceeding to litigate2
the action on the merits in so far as the in rein claim was concerned.
Of course, the case having been settled, it cannot serve as precedent.
79. See note 95 infra.
80. See, e.g., note 78 supra; 18 FoRD. L. REv. at 75; S~a-rE,-r Amul.L RE oR? o2
TnE NEw YORK JUDICIAL CouNcIL 185, 204 (1950).
81. 22 N. Y. S. 2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1940); 18 FoRD. L. REv. at 77.
82. "Your understanding of the decision of the court in so far as setting aside the
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I am not entirely in agreement with your "same transaction" test
which seems to a certain extent to follow the same "cause of action" idea
of Section 5 of the Restatement of Judgments.13 As I understand your
views, a nonresident defendant should be protected only as to claims
added or substituted by an amended or supplemental complaint which do
not form part of the same transaction as any of the claims alleged in the
original complaint. The defendant, if he desires to litigate only the in rein
claim on the merits, would have to make a general appearance as to any
claims contained in the original complaint, in rem or in personam, even if
only in rem jurisdiction has been obtained by the court. Thus in the
Wajtman case, under your proposal, the third-party defendant would not
be protected by a limited appearance as to the amendment there involved
because the claim set up by the amended complaint formed part of the
same transaction. To me it is still a claim asserted by a different party.
On the other hand, under your view, the result in the Mendoza case
would be different, the in personam claim there addet by amendment
being new and independent. I perhaps would be more inclined to go
along with your idea if the "same transaction" test were also applied
to the in personam claims contained in the original complaint, that is,
if the defendant would be protected from those in personam claims which
do not arise out of the same transaction as the in rem claim even though
all are included in the original complaint. Moreover, I still think it
grossly unfair to require a defendant to make a general appearance to
84
contest the claim on the merits where his property has been attached,
especially if the cause of action did not arise in New York.
Despite my own views on the limited appearance, it is necessary, from
a legislative standpoint, to be practical. I doubt that the New York bar,
unless it has no choice by reason of constitutional requirements still
unsettled, would support any measure which goes very much beyond
your proposal.
SMITH: You say that you would be inclined to go along with my "same
service of the summons is concerned is correct.. We did proceed [as to the] in rein claim
and that was subsequently settled." No replies were received to inquiries also directed
to the attorneys in the Zeide and Paprin cases.
83. See RESTATEENT, JUDGimEs § 5, comment g (1942); 18 FoRD. L. Rav. at 90-94.
Section 5 also gives immunity, as to subsequently added causes of action, to the nonresident personally served within the state or who has made a general appearance even
though the original claim sounds in personam. That problem is not within the scope of
this article although such cases are of course persuasive with respect to the In rem-in personam situations. Of course, § 5, which does not deal with original joinder of in rem and
in personam claims, is qualified by § 40 which permits the nonresident to make a limited
appearance in an attachment or creditor's bill situation.
84. See 18 FoRD. L. Rrv. at 81-85.
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transaction" test if it "were also applied to the in personam claims contained in the original complaint, that is, if the defendant would be protected from those in personam claims which do not arise out of the same

transaction as the in rem c ai.n."I I am in favor of your modification
since as to an in personam claim not in any way connected with the in rem
claim asserted in the complaint the court would, in the absence of a
general appearance by 'the defendant, be entirely without jurisdiction
to make a binding adjudication. Why don't you recommend a statute
to that effect?
BROWN: I think that I will attempt to draft a statute along those
lines. Incidentally, you will be interested to know that the Governor
has vetoed the Judicial Council bill. Apparently the veto resulted from
disapproval of the bill by the Committee on State Legislation of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.80 Although the Committee agreed that there was a great need for the bill and conceded that,
"On the whole the bill has been carefully thought out by those who
drafted it and it is well drawn,"8 17it objected to both subdivisions 4 and S
of proposed Section 237-a. As to subdivision 4, which provides
"After a motion made pursuant to this section has been denied, the objection
to the court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be set forth
as a defense in the answer and the defendant may litigate the action on the
merits without being deemed to have waived his objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person"
the Committee objected that elimination of the distinction between types
of objections to jurisdiction over the person would allow relitigation of
jurisdictional objections based upon defects in process or its service.
The Committee is attempting to make a distinction which is not made
by the cases,88 nor, to my knowledge, in actual practice. The distinction as to types of jurisdiction over the person should be eliminated, but
provision should be made prohibiting relitigation of the jurisdictional
objection in all cases8 9
One problem does occur to me in connection with subdivision 4, as it
is now worded. Let us suppose that defendant's objection to the court's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction is overruled. He litigates the action
on the merits, both in rem and in personam. Judgment for plaintiff and
defendant appeals. The appellate court finds that the objection to juris85. See text p. 144 supra (emphasis supplied).
86. BULL= OF THE CoM=afrrE oN STATz LEGrSLATiO0: or TH
BAR or THE Cry OF NEW Yo m, No. 6 at 297 (April 10, 1950).
87. Id. at 300.
88. See note 95 infra.
89. But see note 48 supra.
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diction over the person should have been sustained. Will it merely
reverse as to any in personam portion of the judgment? If so, will not
defendant in substance, in this situation, have been permitted to make
a limited appearance, that is, contest the in rem portion of the action
on the merits? If any possibility of a limited appearance is to be eliminated (and, concededly, the Judicial Council study does not go into
the problem), it would appear that a defendant after a hearing on the
merits should be required to appeal from the denial of his jurisdictional
objection, and, if that be sustained on appeal, be precluded from any
defense on the merits as to the in rem portion of the action.
In so far as subdivision 5, providing
"A notice of the motion made pursuant to this section, if served within
twenty days after service of the complaint and made returnable within ten
days thereafter, or, if there be no sitting of court within ten days, then for
the first term or sitting of court thereafter at which the motion can be heard,
shall operate to stay all further proceedings in the action until the expiration
of ten days after service of a copy of the order deciding the motion and a
written notice of the entry thereof; provided, however, that the court may in
its discretion vacate or modify the stay on motion made upon notice to the
opposing party"
is concerned, the bill was criticized for failing to provide that if the
motion be denied defendant has a specified time within which to appear
generally and serve his answer. "Unless the court should exercise an
inherent discretionary power to give the defendant permission to do so,
an unsuccessful defendant who has carried out the steps provided in the
bill would find himself in default." 90
It appears to me that subdivision 5 is intended to prevent that possibility, and it is so explained in the Judicial Council study." Although
the subdivision does not expressly spell out the time periods applicable
after service of a copy of the order deciding the motion, it seems clearly
intended to coincide with Section 283 of the Civil Practice Act.02
90. BULLETIN OF THE CO.MITTEE ON STATE LEGISLATION OF TnE ASSOCIATION OF TIIE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORX, No. 6 at 307 (April 10, 1950).
91. SIXTEENTH AbNuAL REPORT OF THE NEw YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL 185, 195 (1950).
92. "If objections to a pleading, presented by motion for judgment or by corrective
or regulatory motion, be not sustained, the moving party may serve an answer or reply,
or an amended answer or reply where he has pleaded to a separate cause of actioh,
counterclaim or defense not affected by the motion, as a matter of right, after the decision
of the motion and before the expiration of ten days after service of notice of the entry
of the order deciding the motion, unless the court shall be of the opinion, to be stated
in the order, that the objections are frivolous. Upon the decision of a point of law, at
trial or special term or in the appellate division or court of appeals, the court, in Its
discretion, also may allow the party in fault to plead anew or amend, upon such terms
as are just."
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SMITH: The nub of the Committee's objection to the Judicial Council
bill, as you note, is that since subdivision 1 of the recommended Section
237-a would do away with the distinction between grounds of objection
to the court's jurisdiction of the person, an objection to the sufficiency
of process or its service could, even after a full hearing, be reiterated in
the answer by virtue of subdivision 4. A defendant would thus have
two opportunities to have his objection sustained. 3 Although there is
much to be said for the Committee's position that such a procedure is
undesirable, its contention that a defendant may not under present law
do that very thing is questionable. The Committee says:

"It is true that dicta in certain cases indicate that trite objections to the
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant (as distinguished from objections
that process or its service is insufficient) may be relitigated at the trial, even
after a motion based upon such an objection has been denied. '" 4
No case that I have been able to uncover has drawn a distinction between grounds of objection to jurisdiction after motions properly raising
such objections have been denied. On the contrary, in a recent case
the court noted:
"After the confirmation of the referee's report, defendant answered. The
conclusions of the referee and the subsequent order of the court do not preclude
the defendant from raising and controverting the jurisdiction of the court at
the trial. The decision of the court upon the motion and the recommendation
of the referee were merely interlocutory and hence cannot conclude further
contest of the issues .... 95
Furthermore, although the Committee says that "it may be that all
objections to the jurisdiction of the person of the defendant should be
disposed of before trial, and that no such objection should be permitted
to be raised in the answer,"0 6 it is clear that their main objection is
aimed at permitting objections to process to be raised in the answer.
I fail to see why it is any more undesirable to have two hearings on the
objection to process or its service than it is to have two hearings on
93. Buam= or Tm Co0rTraE oN STATr LrcssrTioN, or Tim Ass0cLTIo or TnE
BA or TnE Crrr or NEw YORK, No. 6 at 307 (April 10, 1950).
94. Id. at 304.
95. de Marigny v. de Marigny, 193 Misc. 250, 252, 81 N. Y. S. 2d 229, 231 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff'd ihern., 275 App. Div. 757, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (Ist Dep't 1949). See albo

Urquhart v. Urquhart, 196 Misc. 664, 667, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 484, 487 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
Fickett v. Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 162 Misc. 18, 19, 293 N. Y. Supp. 566, 563
(App. Term 1st Dep't 1937); see Muslusky v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 225 N. Y. 584.
588, 122 N. E. 461, 462 (1919).
96. BuIXT
or Tim CO~mITEE ox STATE LEISLATIO. or THE ASCLTmiO
or ma
BAR or THE CITY OF NEw YORK, No. 6 at 306 (April 10, 1950).
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the objection that the defendant is a person not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Both objections challenge the jurisdiction of the
court to award in personam relief. The only reason for ever distinguishing between them is that an objection to process is waived by a voluntary
general appearance. 97
The practice of permitting two hearings of jurisdictional objections,
however, should be discontinued. One hearing on the merits of the objection is sufficient. My view is that subdivision 1 of the recommended
new Section 237-a, abolishing the distinction between the grounds of
objection to jurisdiction over the person, should be left unchanged.
Subdivision 4, however, might be redrafted to read substantially as
follows:
"4. Upon a motion made pursuant to this section the court may hear and
determine the objection, or it may direct that the questions of fact be tried
before a referee, or it may allow the same facts to be alleged in the answer
as a defense. If the motion of the defendant is denied on the merits, he shall
not be permitted to reiterate the objection in his answer, but he may either
appeal from the order denying his motion or proceed on the merits without
thereby being deemed to have waived his objection and in the event of an
adverse judgment bring up for review the order denying his motion by specifying it in his notice of appeal from such judgment."
Under this subdivision there could be only one hearing on the merits
of a jurisdictional objection and that hearing would in almost all cases
be held before trial. The court should not, as it is now pbrmitted to do,"
defer decision of jurisdictional questions to the trial of the action
simply because the affidavits are conflicting. In such a case the court
should direct a reference. Provision is, however, made for permitting
a court to defer hearing the jurisdictional objection until the trial of
the action,"" a power which ought to be exercised only under exceptional
97. See text pp. 126-32 supra.
98. E.g., Zatarga v. Zatarga, 196 Misc. 448, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (Sup. Ct. 1949); cJ.
Rubinstein v. Bouard, 262 App. Div. 835, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 403 (1st Dep't 1941); Hannes
v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 202, 20 N. Y. S. 2d
825, 838 (1st Dep't 1940).
99. The pattern followed is that of Rule 108 of the Rules of Civil Practice: "If the
plaintiff on the hearing of a motion specified in rule one hundred and seven shall present
affidavits denying the facts alleged by the defendant or shall state facts tending to obviate
the objection, the court may hear and determine the same and grant the motion, and in its
discretion allow the plaintiff to aniend the complaint upon such terms as are just; or It
may direct that the questions of fact, which shall be clearly and succinctly stated in the
order, be tried by a jury or referee, the findings of which shall be reported to the court
for its action; or it may overrule the objections, and in its discretion may allow the same
facts to be alleged in the answer as a defense. If the objections be made to some of the
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circumstances. One such situation is where substantially the same proof
would be required at the trial as would be required at a hearing in
advance of trial. For example, the validity of a foreign divorce may
be in issue and depend upon the domicile of the defendant in the New
York action (plaintiff in the foreign action) within the state granting
the divorce, and at the same time the in personam jurisdiction of the
New York court may also be in issue and depend upon the domicile of
the defendant within New York at the time process was served upon
him in another state. Another instance where the power to defer determination of the jurisdictional objection might be properly exercised by
a court is when the affidavits are conflicting and one of the parties is
unable to secure a deposition for purposes of a reference 10 True, the
problem of limitations might arise because of the delay in determining
the objection,' 1 but that is a factor to be considered by the court in
determining whether it should permit the objection to be set up in the
answer.
You will note that under subdivision 4 as redrafted above the defendant cannot reiterate the jurisdictional objection in his answer after his
motion has been denied on the merits.0 2 He may either appeal from
the order denying his motion or proceed on the merits without fear of
causes of action, and not to all, judgment may be entered as provided in section ninety-six
of the civil practice act or rule one hundred and ninety-five of the rules of civil practice."
10o. "There is no authority, statutory or otherwise, for the examination of a party or
witness on a preliminary motion separate and apart from a trial? Norton v. Cromwell,
248 App. Div. 707, 290 N. Y. Supp. 107 (1st Dep't 1936); accord, In re Erlanger's "Vill,
231 App. Div. 70, 246 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1st Dep't 1930); Dalinda v. Abegg, 177 Misc. 265,
29 N. Y. S. 2d 5 (Sup. Ct. 1941), af'd rae., 262 App. Div. 999, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 816 (1st
Dep't 1941). Contra: Loonsk Bros., Inc. v. Mednick, 246 App. Div. 464, 285 N. Y. Supp.
801 (4th Dep't 1935); Etter v. Early Foundry Co., 164 Misc. 83, 298 N. Y. Supp. 203
(Sup. Ct. 1937). See 18 FoRD. L. Rav. 82 n. 23.
101. The Committee made another observation with respect to insisting upon determination of jurisdictional objections before trial: "Moreover, the statute of limitations
has run against many causes of action by the time they are reached for trial, so that if
a plea to the jurisdiction,--which under the bill would include an objection based upon
the insufficiency of process or its service,-is sustained at the trial the plaintiff would find
himself barred from commencing a new action; contemplation of this result suggests that all
pleas to the jurisdiction are best disposed of at the inception of the action. Even Section 23
of the Civil Practice Act would not save the plaintiff if there was no adequate service
of the summons.' Bu-imnan or = Coassr='
ox STATz LaoxsrrAz-o: or Tm Assccni'o:
or TH BAR or m Crry or Naw YoRx, No. 6 at 307 (April 10, 1950). The Committee's
observation is sound with respect to defendants who are residents of the state. As to
nonresidents, however, it would seem that § 19 of the Civil Practice Act would afford
relief in certain situations. See National Surety Co. v. Ruffin, 242 N. Y. 413, 152 N. E.
246 (1926).
102. But see note 48 supra.
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waiver and, on appeal from an adverse judgment, bring up for review
the order denying his jurisdictional objection."'
With respect to your objection to subdivision 4 of the Council's recommended new Section 237-a, it is true that to the extent that an appellate
court would permit the in rem portion of the judgment to stand, and
Jackson v. Jackson0 4 strongly indicates that it would, the defendant has
in effect been permitted to litigate the in rem claim on the merits. As a
practical matter I dare say that few indeed are the cases where a defendant's objection that the court has no jurisdiction over his person is
sustained after a court or referee has determined that such objection
is without merit. Theoretically, however, my only thought is that a
defendant whose objection has been overruled and then litigates the
merits is not asking the court to insulate him from an in personam claim,
as is the case of a defendant seeking to make a true limited appearance,
but is more or less resigned to the fact that litigate the merits or not
this court is proceeding on the theory that it has his person within its
jurisdiction. Such being the case, the defendant probably feels that he
has nothing to lose by proceeding on the merits. If he wins, fine; if he
loses, and an appellate court decides that his jurisdictional objection
should have been sustained, he has made an unexpected gain.
As to subdivision 5 of the bill it does seem that it was intended to do
that which the Committee fears it does not do. For clarity's sake, however, the subdivision might be reworded to read as follows (matter in
brackets to be deleted from the Council's recommendation; matter in
italics to be added thereto):
"5. A notice of the motion made pursuant to this section, if served within
twenty days after service of the complaint and made returnable within ten
days thereafter, or, if there be no sitting of court within ten days, then for
the first term or sitting of court thereafter at which the motion can be heard,
shall operate to stay all further proceedings in the action until the [expiration
of ten days after service of a copy of the order deciding the motion and a
written notice of the entry thereof] determination of the motion; provided,
however, that the court may in its discretion vacate or modify the stay on
motion made upon notice to the opposing party. If the motion of the defendant
is denied, he may serve an answer, as a matter of right, before the expiration
of ten days after service of a copy of the order deciding the motion and a
written notice of the entry thereof."
103. That an order denying defendant's motion objecting to jurisdiction under existing
law may be reviewed on appeal without the need for reiteration of the objection in the
answer seems possible. N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT: § 580; see also Application of Dorfman,
66 N. Y. S. 2d 591, 592 (County Ct. 1946).
104. 290 N. Y. 512, 49 N. E. 2d 988 (1943).
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Have you drafted that limited appearance statute?
BROWN: I have drafted a statute, giving the right of limited appearance based upon the "same transaction" test, which might be Section
237-b of the Civil Practice Act:
"Defendant's limited appearance. A defendant in an action within section
two hundred thirty-two who has not been served in a manner sufficient to
confer jurisdiction over his person and who has not made a general appearance
in an action may make an appearance limited to contesting the causes of
action stated in the original complaint, and all causes of action thereafter
added or substituted, which form part of the same transaction as any cause
of action, or part of a cause of action, of which the court would have jurisdiction in the absence of such service or general appearance."
Under this proposed statute, if the plaintiff joins a cause of action
for specific performance with an alternate prayer for damages and a
cause of action for assault and battery, defendant could make an appearance limited to contesting the specific performance cause. By such
an appearance he would subject himself to the in personam jurisdiction
of the court as to the alternate claim for damages because that claim
forms part of the same transaction as the specific performance cause.
He would not, however, have to appear also as to the claim for assault
and battery, a separate and independent claim. Nor could such a separate and independent claim be added by an amended or supplemental
pleading. But, if plaintiff has sued originally merely for specific performance, he could amend to assert an alternate claim for damages
because such claim constitutes part of the same transaction.
S= r: Your proposed Section 237-b should be brought to the attention of the New York bar. It would certainly avoid the unfairness of
a situation like that presented by the Mendoza case. I appreciate the
fact that it does not go so far as you would like in the attachment situation, but I think the section as now proposed would be much more
seriously considered by the New York bar than it would be if it contained a provision also granting the right to make a limited appearance
where a nonresident's property has been attached. Under this proposed
new section, the defendant must appear generally in the attachment
situation, but he would be protected as to any added or substituted
claims which do not form part of the in rem claim originally asserted.
BROWN and SmITH: Well, despite the Governor's veto of the Judicial
Council bill, definite strides have been made during the past year toward
clarification of the special appearance problem. There seems to be good
reason to suppose that at least a special appearance statute will be enacted by the New York legislature in 1951. With good luck something
may even be done about the limited appearance problem.

